Problem-Solving Negotiation: Northern Ireland\u27s Experience with the Women\u27s Coalition Symposium by Nolan-Haley, Jacqueline
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2003
Problem-Solving Negotiation: Northern Ireland's
Experience with the Women's Coalition
Symposium
Nolan-Haley
Fordham University School of Law, jnolanhaley@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Organizations Commons, and the
Women Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nolan-Haley, Problem-Solving Negotiation: Northern Ireland's Experience with the Women's Coalition Symposium, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 387
(2003)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/287
Problem-Solving Negotiation:
Northern Ireland's Experience with
the Women's Coalition
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley and Bronagh Hinds*
Throughout the Troubles, we have often heard the voices of women call-
ing for compassion instead of conflict, collaboration instead of coercion,
and cooperation instead of competition.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Menkel-Meadow challenges us in this Symposium to consider the
relevance of domestic conflict resolution theories in broader cultural contexts.
2
She questions whether the field of conflict resolution offers any broadly applica-
ble propositions that work across all domains. 3 Our interest is on the application
of problem-solving negotiation theory to sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland.
We will focus on a case study of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition
(Women's Coalition)4 whose members participated in the negotiations leading up
to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (Agreement).5 Members of the Coalition
responded to thirty years of sectarian violence with a negotiation process based on
* Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Director of the
Fordham Conflict Resolution and ADR Program. Bronagh Hinds is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of
Governance, Public Policy and Social Research, Queens University, Belfast. She is a founder of the
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and participated in the 1996-1998 negotiations that led to the
Good Friday Agreement 1998. The authors would like to thank Erica Curtis, Shelia Fitzpatrick and
Kim Rogers for their assistance with this article.
I. MAIREAD CORRIGAN MAGUIRE, THE VISION OF PEACE: FAITH AND HOPE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 39 (John Dear ed., 1999).
2. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domes-
tic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theor' and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions].
3. Id.
4. Borrowing from Cynthia Cockburn's language, we credit these women with having filled the
dangerous spaces between themselves and destructive conflict with words instead of bullets. See
CYNTHIA COCKBURN, THE SPACE BETWEEN Us: NEGOTIATING GENDER AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES
IN CONFLICT (1998). The metaphor of creating spaces is a familiar one with female peacemakers in
Northern Ireland. See Swanee Hunt et al., Women Waging Peace: Lessons in Leadership, 24
FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 61, 69 (2000).
5. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Government of Ireland - Alliance Party
- Progressive Unionist Party - Sinn Fein - Social Democratic Labour Party - Ulster Unionist Party -
Women's Coalition: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
751, available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreement.htm [hereinafter The Good Friday Agree-
ment]. The Agreement is known both as the Good Friday agreement, because it was signed on Good
Friday, Apr., 10, 1998, and the Belfast Agreement, indicating where the parties signed the agreement.
See Northern Ireland Online, Key Issues-The Agreement, at
http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreemain.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). In May 1998, a referendum
was held in which more than 71 percent of the people voted in favor of the Good Friday Agreement.
The Good Friday Agreement, supra.
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accommodation, inclusion, and relationship building. These concepts have reso-
nance in American-style problem-solving negotiation. 6  Their "peace story"
unfolds through two years of arduous negotiations. It suggests that there are pro-
cedural aspects of problem-solving negotiation theory that may work across do-
mains, specifically in multi-party, intractable conflict situations where not all
players share the same end game.
Unlike the scholar/practitioners who developed the architecture of modem
problem-solving negotiation, the women who participated in the Women's Coali-
tion had no formal training in conflict resolution theory. Drawn from multiple
walks of life, they approached the bargaining table with a "problem-solving in
action" attitude and actively engaged in the political negotiation process. All of
this occurred in the midst of violent and protracted conflict.7
Women's peacemaking skills have long empowered them as voices for rec-
onciliation in divided societies 8 and therefore, the role of women in preventive
diplomacy, conflict resolution, and post conflict reconstruction is widely advanced
today. 9 Although historically women are credited with being actively involved in
peacemaking efforts at the grassroots level during periods of conflict,' ° they are
not generally considered to play a significant role in formal peace negotiations.'
Northern Ireland proved to be an exception.'
2
I. CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE TROUBLES
A contextual understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict is helpful in illu-
minating some aspects of problem-solving negotiation that may work across do-
mains. Volumes have been written on the conflict and it is beyond the purview of
this paper to address more than its essential elements. The conflict is complex and
6. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE 44 (1999). Commenting on the activities of the
Women's Coalition during the negotiations, former Sen. George Mitchell, who mediated the negotia-
tions said:
The women overcame a great deal of adversity. Early in the process they were not taken seri-
ously in our talks and they were insulted in the Forum. I would not permit such conduct in the
negotiations, but it took many months for their courage and commitment to earn the attention and
respect of the other parties. In the final stages of the negotiations they were serious, important
participants, and were treated as such.
Id.
7. For example, at the same time that the peace negotiations were being conducted, a paramilitary
group engaged in an act of murder. Id. at 173-74.
8. Shelley Anderson, Women's Many Roles in Reconciliation, in PEOPLE BUILDING PEACE 230
(1999).
9. See, e.g., The Windhoek Declaration: The Namuibia Plan of Action on 'Mainstreaming a Gender
Perspective Il Multidimensional Peace Support Operations' (May 2000), at
http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/WindhoekDeclaration.html; S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. SCOR,
55th Sess. (2000) (calling for the broad participation of women in peace-building and post-conflict
reconstruction).
10. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rehn, The Future of Peace Efforts, 25 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD
AFFAIRS 101 (2001).
II. Working Group I, Strasbourg Conference, Participation of Women in the Prevention and Reso-
lution of Conflicts, 55 (Sept. 2001) (copy on file with authors).
12. In Northern Ireland, the voice of women, exemplified by the work of Nobel Prize winner
Mairead Corrigan Maguire was energized to build a culture of nonviolence. See Jennifer Schense,
Creating Space for Change: Can the Voluntary Sector Help End Northern Ireland's Troubles?, II
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 149 (1998).
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comprised of multiple economic, religious, political, and social facets.' 3 Since
the partition of Northern Ireland in 1921, unionists, mainly Protestant, have desired
to remain part of the United Kingdom while nationalists, mainly Catholic, have
wanted Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland. Deep mistrust has
divided both communities. The conflict intensified during a thirty-year period
known as "The Troubles" (1966-1996) 14 when sectarian warfare between Catho-
lics and Protestants, nationalists and unionists resulted in the death of more than
3,600 persons and the wounding of tens of thousands more. 5 In a country with a
population of roughly 1.7 million people, these figures are significant.
After cease-fires by paramilitary groups on both sides, the Peace Talks began
in June 1996 with ten political parties participating. 16 The talks were chaired by
former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, supported by General John de Chastelain of
Canada and Mr. Harry Holkerie, former Prime Minister of Finland. 17 An agree-
ment was reached on Good Friday, April 10, 1998.8
Despite significant advances in peaceful co-existence since the Agreement
was signed, sectarian conflict is still deeply embedded in Northern Ireland.
"Peace Line" walls, topped in some areas by barbed wire, still exist in Belfast to
separate nationalist and unionist communities.' 9 A recent study by University of
Ulster Professor Paul Connelly, demonstrating the intractable nature of the con-
flict, reported that children in Northern Ireland are socialized into sectarianism by
the age of three with negative perceptions of the opposing community. 20 In the
last five years, news reports of a young Catholic crucified on a fence,2' children
13. See FACETS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995).
14. See TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND THE SEARCH FOR
PEACE (1996).
15. DAVID McKITTRICK ET AL., LOST LIVES 13 (1999).
16. MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 46.
17. Id.
18. The Good Friday Agreement, supra note 5. See also Northern Ireland Office,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreement.htm (posting the Agreement in its entirety and providing links
to other relevant information).
19. See EAMONN MALLIE & DAVID McKI'I-'RICK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET STORY
BEHIND THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS 13-14 (1996), wherein the authors note:
Even after the 1994 IRA ceasefire, workmen in Belfast continued to build more of the
'peacelines' which criss-cross and deface the city-high brick and metal walls designed to
separate Protestant and Catholic districts. This is not some governmental effort to impose
segregation: the walls were put up by community demand, and are generally popular in the
districts they divide. They are a symbol of ancient and lasting community divisions.
Id. See also MITCHELL, supra note 6, at I I (describing the walls to be up to thirty feet high). There
are thirty-nine peace walls in Northern Ireland with thirty in Belfast, two in Portadown, one in Lurgan
and six in Derry. BBC Northern Ireland, Eyewitness-Holy Cross-Streetscape Resources, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/northernireland/eyewitness/holycross/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2003). Thirty-two
percent of people killed in the Troubles died within 100 meters of a peaceline and 68 percent within
500 meters. Id. Of the thirty peacelines in Belfast, fifteen are in north Belfast. Id.
20. Press Release, Community Relations Council (June 25, 2002), http://www.community-
relations.org.uk/home/press/press02O625a.htm. One of the characteristics of intractable conflict is the
length of its existence and the fact that children are born and socialized into the conflict. See also
Louis Kriesberg, Intractable Conflicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE 333
(Eugene Weiner ed., 1998).
21. Anne Cadwallader, UDA 'Crucifies' Catholic Man, IRISH ECHO, Nov. 6-12, 2002, available at
http://www.irishEcho.com.
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prevented from entering their school, 2 a mailman attacked by mobs,2 3 and senior
citizens frightened out of their homes during parade season24 have been reminders
that extremist paramilitary groups and opponents of the Agreement are still active
and that conflict of an intractable nature still exists.
In the following section we sketch a brief historical and theoretical account of
problem-solving negotiation and then situate within it the behaviors and strategies
of the Women's Coalition during the multi-party negotiations leading to the
Agreement. Problem-solving negotiation theory has evolved in differing contexts;
and, in our view, there are procedural aspects of it that offer significant potential
for managing situations of intractable conflict.
III. PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION THEORY
A. Historical Background
Scholars and practitioners from diverse academic disciplines have devoted
considerable attention since the second half of the twentieth century to developing
a theory of problem-solving negotiation. Problem-solving theory, as we know it
today, emerged from the field of labor negotiations in the early 1940s.2 5  Profes-
sor Morton Deutsch's early writings in social psychology emphasized the benefits
of cooperative over competitive behaviors and more recently, Deutsch has identi-
fied specific characteristics of cooperative behavior that ultimately may lead to
more constructive resolution of conflicts. 2 6 Taken together, they form a founda-
tional basis for problem-solving theory.
In the context of international relations, the historical roots of problem-
solving have been traced to the work of game theorist Anatol Rapoport, who iden-
tified such concepts as cooperative efforts to advance parties' common interests,
the search for common ground, and joint problem-solving.27 The practice of
adopting problem-solving approaches in international diplomatic efforts was ad-
vanced as a favorable means of producing greater flexibility and more equitable
22. Anne Cadwallader, Bomb Tr' at Holy Cross, IRISH ECHO, Jan. 8-14, 2003, available at
http://www.IrishEcho.com.
23. Brian Lavery, A Catholic Mailman Is Slain As Ulster Violence Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2002, at A6.
24. Ross McKee, Pensioner Vows To Defy Republican Death Threat, NEWS LETTER, June 22, 2002,
at 7.
25. See, e.g., MARY PARKER FOLLETT, DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
MARY PARKER FOLLETT (1942); see also Susan Cross, Three Models of Conflict Resolution: Effects
on Intergroup Expectancies and Attitudes, 55 J. Soc. IsSUES 561 (I 999).
26. Morton Deutsch, Social Psychology's Contributions to the Study of Conflict Resolution, 18
NEGOTIATION J. 307, 311 (2002). Deutsch listed the following characteristics of cooperative behavior:
(I) effective communication; (2) friendliness, helpfulness, and unobstructiveness; (3) coordination of
effort, divisions of labor, orientation to task achievement, orderliness in discussion, and high produc-
tivity; (4) feeling of agreement with the ideas of others and a sense of basic similarity in beliefs and
values, as well as confidence in one's own ideas and in the value that other members attach to those
ideas; (5) willingness to enhance the other's power; (6) defining conflicting interests as mutual prob-
lems to be solved by collaborative effort. Id.
27. P. Terrence Hopmann, Bargaining and Problem Solving: Two Perspectives on hIternational
Negotiation, in TURBULENT PEACE 445, 446-47 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001) (citing ANATOL
RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES (1960)).
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and durable agreements than the then-prevalent "bargaining" paradigm. 28 These
claims gained empirical validity through the problem-solving workshop experi-
ments conducted by John Burton and Herbert Kelman. As participants in these
workshops, individuals from conflicted societies would engage with those whom
they considered the enemy, acknowledging the responsibility of their own com-
munity and acknowledging the pain of the "other" as legitimate.29 Additional
creative expansion of problem-solving in the international arena is found in the
work of Harold Saunders, who developed a variation of the problem-solving
workshops: a dialogue process based on transforming relationships between par-
ties in conflict.
30
A more popularized theory of problem-solving was explicated in the early
1980s with the "principled" negotiation theory of Roger Fisher and William Ury
presented in the book Getting to Yes, 3' and in the realm of American law with
Professor Menkel-Meadow's article, The Theory and Practice of Problem-
Solving.32 The norms that regulated problem-solving in the American legal sys-
tem were similar to those prevalent in international relations, in that parties were
required to separate positions from interests, identify specific needs, and develop
solutions that directly responded to those needs.
B. Theoretical Underpinnings
The development of problem-solving theory was a reaction in part to the pre-
dominant negotiation model of adversarial, positional bargaining, and the negative
behaviors that it produced.33 Problem-solving assumed good faith, honesty, and
integrity in bargaining. 34 Thus, it encouraged parties to build trust into relation-
ships.
The essence of problem-solving theory is a deceptively simple formulaic pre-
scription-negotiators should focus on their underlying needs, preferences, priori-
ties, and interests, as well as those of their opponents, rather than emphasize their
respective positions. Such value-creating behavior and interest-based orientation
sets the stage for integrative bargaining conditions where opportunities for mutual
gain are possible and zero-sum games can be avoided.35 Through mutual informa-
tion-sharing, a greater variety of possible solutions are presented. All negotiators
28. Id. at 447.
29. Id. at 448. See also Working Group 1, Strasbourg Conference, supra note II.
30. Harold H. Saunders, Sustained Dialogue in Managing Intractable Conflict, 19 NEGOTIATION J.
85 (2003). Saunders based this process on his work with parties from the former Soviet Republic of
Tajikistan. Id. Through the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, Saunders conceptualized the process as "sustained
dialogue." Id.
31. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 2d ed. 1991) (1981).
32. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View[.
33. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Propter Honoris Respectuui: Law.yers, Client, and Mediation, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369 (1998).
34. Good faith and fair dealing are longstanding requirements of contractual obligations in the
United States. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
Power Differentials in Negotiation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. I, 49-54 (2000).
35. ALAN RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 131 (3d ed.
2002).
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have the freedom to devise agreements that respond to their real needs. In this
way, problem-solving negotiation theory emphasizes the importance of building
trust, restoring human relationships and recognizing the humanity of the "other"
negotiator. • • 36
Problem-solving skills include the ability to engage in creative thinking, dis-
tinguish interests from positions, share decision-making power, and engage with
other stakeholders in dispute management and resolution. Partnering, dialoguing,
consensus-building, listening, and collaborating are all elements of problem-
solving behaviors.
In the following section, we describe the emergence of the Women's Coali-
tion as a political party in Northern Ireland and then describe some of their behav-
iors, strategies, and approaches as participants in the multi-party negotiations that
led to the Agreement.
37
IV. THE NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN'S COALITION AND THE MULTI-
PARTY NEGOTIATIONS
A. Background
The role of women in maintaining social cohesiveness and stability during the
period of "the Troubles" has been much applauded. Former Secretary of State
Marjorie Mowlam, in her foreward to the book Contesting Politics - Women in
Ireland, North and South stated:
I know that in relation to the peace process we would not be where we
are today if women had not worked as they have for the past 30 years in
their communities, not just in political parties but in trade unions, com-
munity groups, and in the 400 or so women's groups across Northern Ire-
land.
Mowlam's observation resulted from a practical, political reality. Exclusion
from political and other decision-making forums served to increase women's ef-
forts in Northern Ireland to develop their own structures, processes and power
base. Women's active and leading involvement in community and volunteer ac-
tivities stood in stark contrast to their invisibility in the political arena. 39 As the
36. Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative Thinking in Problem
Solving and Legal Education, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 835 (2003).
37. See generally Bronagh Hinds, Women Working for Peace in Northern Ireland, in CONTESTING
POLITICS - WOMEN IN IRELAND NORTH AND SOUTH 109 (Yvonne Galligan et a]. eds., 1999); Kate
Fearon & Monica McWilliams, The Good Friday Agreement: A Triumph of Substance Over Style, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1250 (1999).
38. Marjorie Mowlam, Foreword to CONTESTING POLITICS, supra note 37, at xi.
39. There were many reasons for this: the narrowly defined political agenda, the structure of party
politics, and the hostility of politics in Northern Ireland. Many women activists were concerned about
losing the independence and hard won trust they had achieved across communities through joining
what they considered to be very sectional, sectarian parties. Warring words from some politicians and
little responsible leadership did not offer incentive. Women experienced a complete disregard among
politicians for the issues at the center of their lives; and thus had no meaningful starting point for
engagement with the formal political process. Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 37, at 1254-55;
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climate for peace negotiations improved with the frequency of cease-fires, this
situation changed. Beginning in the early 1990s, women became increasingly
concerned about their political exclusion, and the negative impact that exclusion
was having on the entire peace process. They began to engage in political dis-
course outside the narrow and rigid confines of traditional national politics, often
within the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector.
In 1995, in the context of two cease-fires heralding important political discus-
sions on the future of Northern Ireland, leading women's organizations in Ireland
asked a probing question: "How can any negotiating fora compensate for the fact
that women have no parity at a time when the future agenda for the island, new
structures in Northern Ireland and north/south institutions and arrangements are
being determined?" 4
The response to this question would be the emergence of a new political party
for women.
B. The Emergence of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition
The Women's Coalition was formed in mid-April 1996. This followed suc-
cessful lobbying by several groups including the Northern Ireland Women's
European Platform, who influenced the legislation authorizing a special election
to decide which political parties would be represented at the multi-party negotia-
tions.4 1 This legislation significantly extended access to the negotiation process
beyond the usual political parties.42
Comprised of women from all walks of life, different political aspirations and
religious traditions, the Women's Coalition recruited seventy women to take part
in the election, with many more willing to work on the party's campaign. A press
release announced that while experience in politics was not an essential criterion
for women applying to run for election under the banner of the Women's Coali-
tion, two essential qualifications were sought: "(i) women must have views on
Bronagh Hinds, Women in the House 3 (July 11-12, 1997) (unpublished paper from Charter 88 Consti-
tutional Convention in London) (on file with authors); Bronagh Hinds, The Emergence of the
Women's Coalition I (Oct. 28, 1997) (unpublished paper from Agreed Ireland Forum in London) (on
file with authors) Ihereinafter Hinds, Women's Coalition].
40. Council for the Status of Women & Northern Ireland Women's European Platform, Staking a
Claim on the Future 7 (Jan. 19, 1995) (unpublished paper from Dublin Forum for Peace and Recon-
ciliation) (on file with authors).
41. Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 37, at 1253-54; Bronagh Hinds, Northern Ireland Women's
European Platform, Designation of Parties for the Forthcoming Election in Northern Ireland to the
British Government I (Apr. 10, 1996) (unpublished conference paper) (on file with authors).
42. The Northern Ireland (Entry To Negotiations, etc.) Act of 1996 provided for elections for the
purpose of electing ten parties to take part in negotiations. 1996 N. Ir. Stat. II. All parties wishing to
take part in the election had to be named in the legislation; in all, twenty-three parties and six inde-
pendents were registered in the legislation. The election was conducted on the basis of a two-tier list
system with voting in eighteen local constituencies. The ten parties with the largest aggregates gained
entry to the negotiations. Id. The Women's Coalition came ninth. Id. The six largest parties were
entitled to three delegates and backup teams of three while the four smaller parties were entitled to two
delegates and a backup team of three. Id. The legislation also provided for a forum for all those
elected at local and regional level and for referendums to hear the views of people in Northern Ireland.
Id. The negotiations took place usually three days a week over almost two years, while the forum,
which had no relation to the negotiations, met one day a week.
No. 2]
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
issues and problems facing themselves and their community and (ii) women must
be willing to seek a political accommodation that is inclusive of all interests. 4 3
Unlike most other participants in the multi-party negotiations, the Women's
Coalition did not represent one narrow, sectional interest. It opted for joint lead-
ership rather than a single leader and concentrated on three core issues: inclusion
and accommodation, equality, and human rights.44 All subsequent policies, posi-
tions, and actions were informed by these principles and every woman taking part
in the election for the Coalition signed a pledge to uphold them.
C. Strategies for Developing a Sustainable Agreement
Throughout the negotiations, the Women's Coalition remained focused on its
twin goals of including women on an equal footing with men and achieving ac-
commodations upon which a stable and peaceful future could be built.4 5 The new,
creative approach of the Coalition prevented the formation of rigid bargaining
positions.4 6 In this way, its internal practices modeled behavior for the multi-party
negotiations.
47
The Coalition entered the negotiations with a specific frame of mind-to
reach a settlement that could move Northern Ireland beyond the regular cycles of
conflict in every generation. Specifically, the Coalition sought a durable settle-
ment that could win the consent, allegiance, and active support of all. For the
Coalition this meant engaging in a comprehensive set of problem-solving strate-
gies:
-- Structuring an inclusive negotiation process involving all those who
had been successfully elected to participate in the negotiations, as well as
consultation with other interest groups that were not directly represented;
-- Generating a comprehensive and complex discussion agenda that
would address the needs and interests of all the participants;
-- Building relationships and helping others to transform relationships;
43. Press Release, Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (Apr. 23, 1996) (on file with authors).
Elections were held at the end of May 1996. Just seven weeks after its formation, the Women's Coali-
tion was elected as one of the top ten political parties in Northern Ireland, thereby securing a place for
itself at the negotiation table. The Coalition's success in capturing the election just behind the most
well-known parties, its ability to remain united, and its capacity to stay focused while making substan-
tive contributions during the negotiations - all with no background in party politics - was no small feat
given the contentious and contested political arena. This accomplishment was due in large measure to
the women's prior experience in engaging in collaborative processes, along with a strong will to suc-
ceed and a determination to interrupt the culture of failure that had dogged Northern Ireland politics for
decades.
44. Yvonne Galligan, The Politics of Women's Representation in Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland, Address at the John Henry Whyte Memorial Lecture (Nov. 22, 2001),
www.qub.ac.uk/cawp/research/whytelecture.htm.
45. Election Communication, Northern Ireland Women's Coalition Manifesto (May 30, 1996) (on
file with authors).
46. Id.
47. Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 37, at 1259.
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-- Contributing positively with ideas and solutions rather than with nega-
tives;
-- Listening and demonstrating genuine comprehension of others' ideas
and paying attention to body language and dynamics;
-- "Interpreting" between other parties to ensure that differences in posi-
tions were clear and could be addressed without conflict being exacer-
bated by confusion over communication or language; and
-- Building cross-party collaboration and consensus.
48
D. Process-oriented and Outcome-focused
The organizational management and community action backgrounds of
women in the Coalition meant that they were attuned to the process and dynamics
of negotiations. Thus, the Coalition was clearly "process-oriented" as well as
"outcome-focused." Coalition members had learned valuable lessons from their
collective past. Having witnessed proxy battles fought over procedure rather than
political content and having listened to abstract legalism and pettiness in strident
public speeches attacking others, the Coalition quickly identified what their lead-
ership would describe as "the overwhelming sense of defensiveness and fear
which results in some parties seeking to close down options and take up en-
trenched positions long before political possibilities have been explored. ' 49 The
Coalition declared that it had entered the Multi-Party Talks in June 1996 with the
intention of "nurturing the Talks, engaging in the necessary procedural discus-
sions and keeping doors open rather than slamming them shut.",
50
E. Inclusion and Democracy
The Coalition's vision of inclusion extended even to paramilitaries. For ex-
ample, before and during the two years of negotiations, the Coalition consistently
promoted full participation of all elected parties, even when some parties with
paramilitary links were excluded from time to time over the failure to honor
cease-fires. 5' This approach differed from that of many other political parties who
argued vociferously for the exclusion of certain parties from the talks and refused
to dialogue with them when they were present.
The Coalition took a significant step to make inclusion meaningful by con-
vincing the parties to change the governing Rules of Procedure for negotiations so
that all parties shared in the decision-making power. 52 Its understanding of inclu-
sion went beyond the involvement of all political actors to achieve engagement,
48. Id. at 1257-61.
49. Monica McWilliams & Pearl Sagar, Women Finding Hope, IRIsH NEWS, July 1, 1996.
50. Id.
51. Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 37, at 1261.
52. See Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, Submission on Procedural Guidelines and Opening
Plenary Agenda (June 14, 1996) (copy on file with authors); Northern Ireland Negotiations Rules of
Procedure (July 29, 1996) (copy on file with authors).
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whenever possible, with civic leaders from across the spectrum of society. Con-
sistent dialogue between Coalition negotiators and a broader constituent base,
through monthly open meetings and larger consultative conferences, enabled the
Coalition to keep those outside the talks abreast of developments at the negotiat-
ing table. It also helped to keep negotiators in touch with the views and feelings
on the ground. This in turn formed part of the feedback the Coalition could share
within the talks and, specifically, bring to the attention of the Independent Chairs.
The dialogue with the public helped to prepare them for compromises that would
be required in the long term, allaying fears about an agreement that was too ex-
treme.
Publishing its inclusive and problem-solving platform in the Irish News, the
Coalition argued that it was necessary to address the fears and concerns of all
other participants, engage in discussion with all, value and build on others' ideas
whenever possible and frame and reframe contributions in a manner that would
lead to solutions.53 It described itself as "solution-focused," and argued "that all
parties and interests have to be heard if realistic political options are to emerge."
54
This approach was in marked contrast to the negotiating behavior of some of the
traditional political parties who would defend their own position at all costs, sup-
port it with intemperate language and wild assertions in the media to keep sup-
porters in line, herd supporters in a particular direction, and threaten the entire
process while doing so.
F. Establishing New Standards of Negotiating Behavior
The Women's Coalition was determined to play its part in creating a different
expression of democracy that would allow negotiation to flourish. An abnormal
and deviant political culture that indulged in antagonistic, bullying, sectarian, and
sexist behavior had thrived during years of conflict and had become embedded as
normal in the minds of politicians, the media, and those working in the political
arena. Demonizing people and parties was standard practice, while open and de-
mocratic debate based on well-presented arguments, especially on contentious
issues, was rare. Some politicians chose to vilify and demonize opponents in
order to beat them out of an argument or to ensure they had no standing among the
public. Terms such as "traitor," dangerous in the midst of a violent conflict, were
used to describe those who were prepared to consider compromise, agreed to dia-
logue, or envisaged a negotiated settlement and common future. The language
frequently used carried violent and militaristic overtones that corroded the democ-
ratic process, with opponents to the multi-party peace talks speaking about "bat-
tle," "the enemy," and "destruction. 55 Women were called "whinging," "whin-
ing," and "feckless," or admonished to "breed for Ulster" rather than engage in
politics. 56 Statements such as, "Republicans cannot be appeased," "Tigers belong
behind bars, they are only safe when they are shot and stuffed and mounted on the
53. McWilliams & Sagar, supra note 49.
54. Id.
55. Hinds, Women's Coalition, supra note 39, at 6.
56. Id.
(Vol. 2003
Problem-Solving Negotiation
wall," were not uncommon." 57 Even those supportive of the peace process talked
about "confronting," "eyeballing," and "smashing. 58
Northern Ireland had been damaged by decades of adversarial and violent
politics. It was clear that such behavior was a barrier to dialogue and serious en-
gagement. Abuse was used as a tool to thwart substantive negotiation and politi-
cal progress. Fundamental change was required if more women were to be en-
couraged to participate in politics. The Coalition decided that this negative lan-
guage and behavior had to be interrupted and that it would challenge old attitudes
and set new standards for respect and competence. It refused to accept abuse as
normal political banter and constantly confronted disrespectful attitudes and ac-
tions with a view to fostering inclusion, respect, and political progress. It worked
to free the concept of compromise from the negative connotation of the word
"traitor." These efforts played a more important role in the negotiation process
than has often been credited by observers. 59
G. Dialogue and Consensus
A key reason women wanted to be involved in the negotiations was to argue
for and demonstrate a different way of doing things---concentrating on solutions
to shared problems rather than on mutually exclusive aspirations, and driving
negotiation by values and visions for the future rather than protecting historical
certainties. As noted by Professor Christine Bell, the history of Northern Ireland
shows that "adversarial politics lends itself to 'positional bargaining' where both
sides are afraid to volunteer the first concession [and] each may take a harder
position than that for which they are prepared to settle and the whole thing be-
comes a zero sum game."6 °
Instead of remaining fixed in this traditional positional bargaining mode, the
Coalition attempted to provide leadership for redefining problems in mutually
beneficial ways. The Coalition, comprised of women with completely opposite
aspirations for new constitutional arrangements, opposed presenting options and
choices as a zero-sum game with the negotiations as a battleground for the total
victory of one side or another.
Throughout the negotiations, Coalition representatives continued collabora-
tive practices of checking the views of others and seeking to reach accommoda-
tion across a wide variety of differing interests. Such practices, combined with
their prior experience in cooperative efforts, helped the women approach the
peace talks confident that their strategies were in the best interests of promoting
dialogue and consensus. Every effort to describe the Coalition as 'unionist' or
'nationalist,' for example, or to drive a wedge between women from different
religious or political traditions by insisting that the Coalition take a position on the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland, met with failure. 61 Despite concerted
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. MITCHELL, supra note 6.
60. Elizabeth Meehan, Democracy Unbound, in DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE, RECONSTITUTING
POLITICS 23, 29 (Robin Wilson ed., 1996) (quoting Christine Bell), available at
http://www.democraticdialogue.org/report3/report3b.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
61. See Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 37, at 1257.
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efforts to know "which camp the Women's Coalition was in" in order to interpret
Coalition votes as unionist or nationalist, Coalition representatives declined to
engage in positional-based bargaining. 62 They were accustomed to dialoguing
through difference, confronting and respecting difference, and transcending dif-
ference in pursuit of a common purpose. They were prepared to live with ambigu-
ity and experiment with various configurations until they reached a consensus.
H. Relationship Building
The Coalition entered the negotiations in good faith with a will to make them
work. It was prepared to move beyond the status quo to a position where all po-
litical players were entitled to put their aspirations and views on the table and to
have them taken into account. It worked to reach a political accommodation with
others that was shaped by inclusive dialogue of all parties. It assumed a duty to
demonstrate good faith by working to develop relationships between itself and
other parties and building trust and confidence in the process. The Coalition did
not constrain itself in any way when meeting other parties: it moved more easily
than most between political parties and from an early stage successfully built a
solid relationship between the four smaller parties. This positively impacted the
negotiation's procedural dynamics and ultimately, the content of the Agreement.
63
Even in the face of adversity, the Coalition sought to extend the hand of
friendship, build relationships, and practice inclusion. After nearly two years of
opposition and filibustering in the negotiations, two anti-Agreement unionist par-
ties 64 excluded themselves by walking away shortly before the end of the negotia-
tions. Despite having been the recipient of a considerable share of their criticisms,
the Coalition made every effort to demonstrate bridge-building and promote coop-
eration by inviting the parties' return. During deliberations on principles and
requirements for the Agreement, the Coalition, unlike any other party, made a
point of directing these conversations to both the process and the content of the
Agreement. Parties to the Agreement focused their discussions on content and
underestimated the importance of consistent attention to process and relationships.
62. Id.
63. Significantly, the Coalition played a small but critical role in moving the negotiations forward to
the substantive political agenda after months of stalling. A proposal on a comprehensive agenda
framed by the leading nationalist (SDLP) and unionist (Ulster Unionist Party, UUP) parties left the
UUP exposed to a diatribe on traitorous behavior. An adjournment called by anti-agreement unionists
to give them time to prepare their attack, created space for the Women's Coalition to galvanize the
smaller parties along with another party to co-sign the agenda proposal. Thus, the UUP was joined by
others from the same political hue upon its return to the table and the opposition no longer had a basis
for confrontation.
64. These were the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the United Kingdom Unionist Party
(UKUP).
65. According to the Coalition's Principles and Requirements Paper, the process for agreeing upon
and delivering the Agreement encompassed the following commitments:
[Clommitment to work to win consent inside the Talks through sufficient consensus of all parties,
not two trading blocks; a commitment to collective responsibility for the outcome, and for being
honest about the compromise, so there is a shared project to put to the people; [and] a commit-
ment to collective leadership to winning the greatest possible majority among the people ... on a
common platform not on an adversarial basis.
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, Principles and Requirements for Strand I and Strand 2 of the
Multi-Party Talks (Oct. 1997) (on file with the authors).
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The single greatest difficulty facing the Agreement was and continues to be the
capacity of parties to demonstrate shared responsibility for a common project and
collective leadership in its full implementation. Nevertheless, the negotiation
process was sounder than any before, due to its inclusiveness and the comprehen-
sive agenda. Despite setbacks in implementation, 66 the Agreement has endured
and has established a solid baseline for further progress in the peace process and
the framework for constructive political engagement. To conclude on a hopeful
note in the vernacular of problem-solving: "[T]he reason why this Agreement will
work is because it presented and utilized space in which to create multiple options
,,67for mutual gain.
V. RESONANCES, EXPERIENCES, AND AFFINITIES
Professor Menkel-Meadow cautions that Western conflict resolution theories
may not work across multiple domains. 68 She has doubts about the "exportation"
of American-style dispute resolution, but does not accept the theory that such
exportation is "always wrong and imperialistic." 69 Other scholars in the field of
comparative dispute resolution have observed that comparisons can be misleading
and have warned, for example, against comparing South Africa to Northern Ire-
land regarding the question of whether societal transformation is possible.7 °
Reflecting on Professor Menkel-Meadow's "exportation" skepticism, we
question the use of the term "exportation" in the context of this discussion and
rather suggest thinking about the roles that affinity and resonance play. Even
though cultures and context may differ, there are affinities that cross national bor-
ders, cultures, and boundaries. Affinity and resonance are fundamental concepts
among self-help groups in the domestic sphere who have suffered through in-
credible conflict, difficulty, and pain. They are also often shared across bounda-
ries by people who are affected by and genuinely seeking ways out of conflict.
Among these groups there is a heightened sensitivity to affinity with people who
find themselves in the same situation, coupled with an eager ear for stories, theo-
ries, and techniques that resonate with their own experiences. This approach also
places importance on context without detracting from learning lessons, drawing
comparisons, and exploring similarity and difference to illuminate and inform
decision-making. Thus, within an "affinity and resonance" framework we cau-
tiously suggest that there are some aspects of problem-solving negotiation that
66. There were many rows over implementation. The Assembly was suspended on several occa-
sions. Elections that should have been held in May 2003, were suspended while further discussions
took place. BBC News, Blair Postpones NI Elections (May 1, 2003), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/fr/. The elections were finally held on November 26, 2003. See Glenn
Frankel, Election Sets Back Accord in N. Ireland, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2003, at Al.
67. See Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 37, at 1271.
68. Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions, supra note 2, at 324.
69. Id. at 325.
70. See, e.g., John McGarry, Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa, Political
Studies, XLVI, 853-70 (1998). Hazel Markus also points out in her critique of Fisher and Ury's
GETTING TO YES, supra note 3 1, that conflict is configured differently and modes of conflict resolution
preferred by cultural groups in other social contexts may differ from the European American perspec-
tive of conflict. See Hazel Rose Markus & Leah R. Lin, Conflictways: Cultural Diversity in the Mean-
ings and Practices of Conflict, in MELISSA L. NELKIN, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION 34 (2001).
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may be useful across domains and provide workable principles applicable in other
situations of intractable conflict. These concepts relate to inclusion, trust, and
relationship building.
A. Inclusion
We agree with Professor Menkel-Meadow's observation regarding the pre-
dominance of two-party negotiation models in the formation of dispute resolution
theory and practice. 7 However, we suggest that more attention needs to be paid
to the role and dynamics of multi-party negotiations, particularly in situations of
intractable conflict. This is true, not simply for learning more about managing
process issues, but also to gain insights on the challenge of ensuring the sustain-
ability of any agreement reached in negotiations. Inclusion is a key principle that
contributes to long-term durability of a negotiated agreement. As the experience
of the Northern Ireland peace talks has shown, it is a principle that makes a differ-
ence; previous negotiations had failed in Northern Ireland because of their exclu-
sive nature. The inclusion of additional political parties removed some of the
barriers to trust, enhanced the process of relationship-building, and motivated
parties to concentrate on crafting solutions to shared problems.
Professor Menkel-Meadow also observes new approaches and innovation in
conflict resolution coming from the NGO sector.7 2 This resonates with the North-
ern Ireland experience where the engagement of civic leaders and the public as
stakeholders in the outcome helped the parties to share ownership and responsibil-
ity for the future-even if their particular goals were not always achieved. The
importance of including non-political actors-civic leaders and community organ-
izers-in public negotiation processes leads to a greater focus on the role of
women who are most often found in these sectors and greater considerations of
how they may be included in formal negotiation processes.
7 3
Professor Menkel-Meadow raises a question about the tension between a fo-
cus on the past, particularly on matters of accountability and justice, and an eye on
the future.74 She hints that a way of managing this tension might be the use of a
practice adopted by the Women's Coalition, moving beyond self-needs to articu-
lating communal and societal needs such as social justice.75 An inclusive and
comprehensive agenda, formulated through an inclusive process, is the basic re-
quirement for reaching a forward-looking outcome based on new arrangements
71. See Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions, supra note 2, at 330-33.
72. Id. at 340.
73. Using the examples of the United States and the European Union, it becomes clear that women's
access to political decision-making is a common topic, but rarely an issue in situations of conflict in
which these governments intervene. We need to consider what responsibility the United States and the
European Union's global strategists, peripatetic negotiators and intervention delegations have to suffi-
ciently and prominently include women participants so that "political democracy" means women and
men at the negotiating table. See Bronagh Hinds, Moving the Agenda Globally 10 (Feb. 2000) (un-
published paper from Bejiing + 5 Pacific Region Conference) (on file with authors).
74. Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions, supra note 2, at 338.
75. Id. at 338-39. Entering the negotiations with a commitment to the principles of inclusion, equal-
ity, and human rights gave the Coalition a yardstick by which to judge success.
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and promising eradication of old injustices. 76  In short, properly mediated inclu-
sion has greater possibility to lead to a sustainable outcome because all interests
have been given the opportunity to be part of framing the future.
B. Trust and Relationship Building
In societies afflicted by intractable conflict, negotiation is usually only the
start of a longer-term process that includes several separate and overlapping
stages: negotiation, agreement, implementation, transition from conflict, and
transformation of society.77
In our view, trust is overrated as a starting point for negotiations and in some
cases it can be used as a stalling mechanism to delay the onset of negotiations. In
situations of intractable conflict, particularly where violence has been part of the
conflict, it is unreasonable to expect that parties will come to the table with any
developed sense of trust. Experience in Northern Ireland suggests that trust is
important not in beginning a negotiation but in concluding an agreement and par-
ticularly in sustaining delivery.78
Trust is a critical value at the implementation stage of negotiation, an area
which is still underdeveloped in our view. 79 Those who enter negotiations with
fixed bargaining positions, a practice that is particularly deep-rooted in a long-
running conflict, have little time or patience to focus on learning new processes
and dynamics, even when a negotiation is managed in a manner that leads them
halfway through this learning process. When content outcome is prized above
relationships or joint ownership and the resulting agreement is then sold to sup-
porters as a "win" over the other side, the cycle of positional bargaining continues.
To the extent that problem-solving negotiation processes create space for trust
to develop, it moves the parties away from the positional bargaining cycle. It also
offers better prospects for developing and refining operating principles to guide in
the implementation of an agreement. Trust can be developed through confidence-
building measures such as demonstrating integrity and respect for others, making
and keeping promises, taking risks, and experiencing reciprocation in kind.
Agreements will be tested in the implementation stage and it is here that the pres-
ence or absence of trust development may make a critical difference. We suggest
76. The Women's Coalition found that one way of helping others to square the circle was to contrib-
ute working papers based on combined interests and needs rather than traditional combative positions.
When negotiations are based on a comprehensive, rather than exclusive agenda, and principles, such as
inclusion, equality, and human rights, are used to "proof' proposals, there is greater possibility that the
outcome can incorporate acknowledgment of past grievances within a more universal perspective that
delivers an agreement that is "forward looking" in protections and provisions.
77. As a practical matter, informal negotiation frequently continues between those who agree and
those who do not, and between former, and some would say still current, opponents who find them-
selves on the same side of the agreement.
78. For example, in the case of Northern Ireland, the Agreement envisaged the involvement in
government of a party who disagreed with the outcome of the negotiations and tried its utmost to have
the Agreement rejected by the people of Northern Ireland. Thus the end of formal negotiations, even
with an Agreement in place with the support of more than 71 percent of the population, is not the end
of conflict.
79. Questions for future research include: How are the terms of an agreement communicated to the
public? How is constituency and public support gained? How are trust values sustained in relation to
the long-term durability of an agreement?
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that greater attention needs to be given in negotiations to how parties intend to
manage a process of implementation, including continuing to build relationships
and consolidate trust.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The experience of the Women's Coalition in writing its chapter of the North-
ern Ireland peace story suggests two aspects of problem-solving processes that
have resonance for scholars and practitioners in the field of comparative dispute
resolution. First, when a negotiation process is structured in an inclusive fashion,
so that all stakeholders have a meaningful ability to participate, trust begins to
develop and there is greater potential for generating mutually beneficial options
and realizing mutual gains. When that negotiation process is then perceived pub-
licly as being inclusive of all stakeholders, there is a greater likelihood of commu-
nity acceptance of the outcome. Second, when dealing with conflict of an intrac-
table nature, a commitment to relationship-building goes a long way towards de-
veloping the strategic alliances with diverse communities that are essential to
insuring the long-term durability of negotiated agreements.
The Women's Coalition's consistent attention to process and relationships
during the peace process negotiations marked a significant departure from tradi-
tional, positional-based bargaining that had characterized politics in Northern
Ireland. The significance of process concerns in this case study suggests that
problem-solving negotiation theory may be informed by insights from procedural
justice studies, 80 and perhaps at the same time offer new perspectives on develop-
ments in that field.
80. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got
To Do With It? 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001).
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